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FRANKS

v.
DELAWARE
1.

State/Criminal
SUMMARY:

Timely

Challenge is brought against the "four corners"

rule, whereby the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search
warrant is judged at a suppression hearing merely on the basis of
the ·evidence before the magistrate who issued the warrant.

Evidence

tending to impeach the credibility of the supporting affidavit
is considered immaterial if not presented to the original magistrate.
2.
burglary.

FACTS:

Petr was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and

His defense to the charges at trial was consent of the

,I

victim.

Evidence was introduced at trial consisting of clothes

and a knife of the def.

These were found by police officers con-

ducting a search of def.'s home relying upon a search warrant.
An affidavit was relied upon for the warrant.

At the suppression

hearing, petr proffered testimony to prove that the conversations
.....,
with petr to which the affiant testified had never occurred.

The

trial court refused petr's proffer, relying on the "four corners"
rule.

The Sup. Ct. of Del. affirmed.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Because the warrant issuance hearing is

necessarily ex parte, the suppression hearing affords a def. his
first chance to challenge the validity of the testimony relied
upon in issuing the warrant.

Petr contends that due process and

the Fourth Amendment require that he be given the chance to make
his attack on the affidavit.

Significant prejudice resulted from

the introduction of the clothes and knife at trial.

Exclusion of

such evidence is necessary to deter official violations of Fourth
Amendment rights.

Alternative sanctions, such as perjury indict-

ments, or civil actions

::· for damages,

are ineffective deter-

I
)

rents.
Petr observes that this Court left open the question of
challenging the validity of supporting evidence when last it
. addressed the question, in Rugendorf v. U.S., 376 U.S. 528, 531-32
(1964):

"This Court has never passed directly on the extent to

which a court may permit such examination, when the search warrant
is valid on its face and when the allegations of the underlying
affidavit established 'probable cause'; however, assuming, for
the purpose of this decision, that such attack may be made, we
are of the opinion that the search warrant here is valid."

The A.G. of Del. responds that petr's evidence would not have

(

shown untruthfulness of the affiant.

Recognizing that some courts

have permitted an exception to the "four corners" doctrine where
evidence of misstatement of an affiant is so severe as to constitute
an imposition on the magistrate, the A.G. argues that there was
prel~rninary

no such

showing here.

Since the def. admitted his

-- ----

presence in the victim's horne and that he had sexual relations

- -

with her, and since the knife and clothing served only to identify
petr with the scene of the crime, the A.G. maintains that if any
error occurred it was harmless.

Finally, the A.G. points out six

cases, four of them within the last seven yrs., where the Court
was presented with the question raised in this petition yet
denied cert.
(See resp. at 6) . .
4. DISCUSSION:
For purposes of this appeal, as was the case before the

(~

Del. Sup. Ct., the proffer of evidence must be accepted as made,
so the A.G.'s argument that petr could not really have proved a
misstatement is irrelevant.
contention of harmless error.

Likewise of no merit is the A.G.'s
It is true that petr admitted his

presence in the house, but the introduction of the knife was
certainly probative against the one point of defense advanced by
petr:

that the victim consented.

The worthiness of this petn.

must, therefore, be decided on whether or not it is considered
necessary to declare a federal constitutional standard for validity
of affidavits to parallel the federal constitutional standard for
sufficiency of affidavits.
The Del. Sup. Ct. applied a strict "four corners" doctrine.
Its decision did not · recognize the possible exception for the case
where a magistrate is "imposed upon", so .it did not address whether

J

I

~c.:

-

r,..,...,

lA/

the proffered evidence here would have met that standard.

I r-

Rather,

the Del. Court recognized that the Sup. Ct. had left the question
of challenging validity open in Rugendorf.

Its choice was with

the majority of states which have adopted a strict r:ule against
permitting a challenge to supportive evidence.
suppression hearing is not a guilt

This is because a

determination.

Its purpose

is only to determine whether the magistrate had probable cause to
issue the warrant.

And probable cause from a constitutional

standpoint can be supplied by false evidence relied upon in
I

good faith.

To the extent the def.'s evidence bears upon guilt

or innocence, it may be introduced attrial, so no harm to def.
results.
In King v.

u.s.,

282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960), relied on by

petr, the court recognized that the law in federal courts was
different from the law in state courts ,on this question.

In

I

King, the court struck down a warrant that had relied upon an
· affidavit signed with a fictitious name.

An accurate name was

required "to enable an aggrieved person to prove and challenge
the legality of the warrant."
R. Crim. Pro. 4l(e)

The Fourth Circuit relied on Fed.

(now, 4l(f)) rather than any constitutional

provision in arriving at its conclusion.
Some federal courts follow
See,

~,

a y~trict

four corneri theory.

U.S. v. Hatcher, 473 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1973) (dictum);

Wangrow v. U.S., 399 F.2d 106, 114 (8th Cir. 1968),
393

u.s.

933.

~denied,

The Ninth Circuit catalogues the varying standards

in the federal system in U.S. v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 53 (9th

(_

Cir. 1974):

Some circuits have held that if the allegations
in an affidavit contain a prima facie showing of
probable cause, the defendant may not challenge
the underlying validity of the affidavit. More
recent decisions, however, have permitted such a
challenge. The Supreme Court has extensively
examined the sufficiency of the alleg a tions
contained in affidavits to show probable cause,
but it has not squarely decided whether a defendant may go behind the face of an affidavit t b
challenge the veracity of the allegations.
See the cases cited in footnotes at 495 F.2d at 55.

The solution

reached by the Ninth Circuit in Damitz was to allow in evidence
challenging veracity, and then to determine the validity of the
warrant on the basis of the remaining unrefuted parts of the
supporting evidence.

Also, good faith reliance on the statement

of a non-government affiant was permitted.

Other federal courts

have permitted challenges only if they allege the magistrate was
imposed upon.

See U.S. v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969),

cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002, and cases cited at p. 4 of resp. brief.
The present petn must be judged on the ground employed by
the Del. Sup. Ct., which was a strict four corners approach.
It is uncontested that that is the majority rule among the
states, and as just described, several federal circuits apply
substantially the same rule.

Petr cannot raise the conflict

among the circuits as reason to grant his petn from a state
court, and the conflict among the differing state standards is
insufficient grounds for cert.

Most importantly, the narrowest

rule (which was the rule applied here) keeps out no evidence
relevant to guilt or innocence.

It judges probable cause on

the basis of the facts as presented in good faith to a magistrate.
Petr does not allege that those facts, as alleged, were insuf-

l /

ficient to sustain the warrant under the "sufficienty of warrant"
decisions of this Court.

Hence, petr's argument comes down to

I

l

asserting the need for an

c

exc~us~onaLx

·~~~

-- ______

--~--~-------

affidavits supporting search warrants.
Whatever additional deterrence an exclusionary rule would
offer against perjurious affidavits is highly doubtful.

Parti-

\~

cularly is this so where the affiants were not criminal
gators but third

part ~ s

(in this case, the Director of

-----------------

Center) for whom any deterrent value of an exclusionary
would be entirely lost.

The very fact that this Court has under-

taken to declare the requirements of sufficienty with some care
indicates that the question of probable cause for a warrant is
to be determined as of the time the magistrate makes his decision.
The various states should be allowed to continue with their own
rules on this subject.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

Deny cert.

There is a response.
8/30/77
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BENCH MEMO
To: Mr. Justice Powell

February l S', 1978

From: Jim Alt
No. 76-517.6, Franks v. Delaware.
The question in this case is whether petitioner was (or
might have been) entitled to present evidence at a suppression
hearing to prove that police affidavits supporting a search
warrant contained false statements of fact.

The courts below,

following the "four-corners rule," held that petitioner would
not be entitled to challenge the truth of the allegations in the
affidavits under any circumstances.

I o FACTS.
Cynthia Bailey reported to police that she had been raped

7

in her home by a man of a particular physical description who
wore clothes of a particular description and carried a knife.
Police obtained a warrant to search petitioner's home for
evidence linking him with the crime.
The affidavit in support of the warrant, sworn to by
Detectives Brooks and Gray, alleged in substance (App. 6-8):
(1) that when petitioner was arraigned on an unrelated sexual
misconduct charge, he blurted out that he thought he was under
arrest for raping Cynthia Bailey (1[1[1-8); (2) that petitioner
lived within sight of Cynthia Bailey's home (1[13); (3) that the
physical description given by Bailey matched petitioner's (1[14);
(4) that in a "personal conversation" with the affiant, two

-

employees of the Delaware Youth Center, where petitioner was

--------~------------------------·
employed,
said tha; pe,£itioner cust~marily wore clothing

ma ~hing

that described by Bailey (1[1[15-17); and (5) that petitioner
previously had been convicted for assault with intent to rape (1[18).
The search of petitioner's home produced the clothing described
and a knife, all of which were introduced at trial.

Because

petitioner's defense was consent, it appears that ~nly the knifi)
was relevant to his guilt or innocence.

-

Petitioner contends, though,

~--~------------------that his trial
strategy might have differed if all this evidence

had been suppressed. Brief for Petitioner 15.
As I read petitioner's oral offer of proof at the suppression
hearing, he sought to prove that the detectives who swore to the
affidavit supporting the warrant never spoke to the two employees
at the Delaware Youth Center about petitioner's customary mode of

dress.
II. DECISION BELOW.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to allow inquiry beyond the face of the warrant and
supporting affidavit:

f

"The majority of the jurisdictions considering this question
have decided that no attack upon the veracity of an
underlyin~ affidavit may be made • • • • We agree with the
major i~ rul ~ for two reasons.
First, it is the function
of the issuing magistrate to determine the reliability
of information and credibility of affiants in deciding
whether the requirement of probable cause has been met.
There has been no need demonstrated for interfering with
this function. Second, neither the probable cause nor
suppression hearings are adjudications of guilt or
innocence; the matters asserted by defendant are more
properly considered in a trial on the merits." App. 40.
III. ARGUMENTS.
A. Petitioner.

Petitioner contends that inquiry into the

veracity of affidavits supporting a search warrant must be allowed
in order to determine whether probable cause in fact existed.
Because warrants issue ex parte and usually in great haste, the
issuing magistrate cannot be expected to evaluate or determine
with much accuracy the veracity of such affidavits.

But at some

point, such a determination should be available.
Appeals courts routinely review magistrates' determinations
of whether affidavits on their face support probable cause; thus,
it would not be unseemly for appeals courts to review magistrates'
determinations as to veracity.
Petitioner also contends that defendants should not be required
to make some preliminary showing before a hearing into the veracity

I
I

of affidavits supporting a warrant may be held.

This is so

because "in most cases a defendant has neither specific evidence
nor the means to get specific evidence of false allegations, since
most jurisdictions do not permit discovery depositions in
criminal cases."

Brief for Petitioner 13.

Petitioner contends that suppression of evidence seized
pursuant to warrants based on false affidavits is necessary because
other remedies, such as civil damages suits and perjury prosecutions,
are sought too rarely to provide realistic deterrence of police
misconduct • . His bottom line on suppression is "that every
material misstatement made either intentionally or negligently
by an affiant should require exclusion of the evidence obtained
as a result of such misstatement." Brief for Petitioner 16.

But

he would not require suppression on the basis of "innocent
misrepresentations." Id., at 15.
B. The State.

The State contends that suppression of evidence

seized under warrants supported by false affidavits would serve
only "to weed out what must be a minimal number of perjurious
government agents."

Brief for Respondent 6.

As to these instances,

other remedies such as "contempt of court, or official misconduct
prosecutions and/or civil rights actions against the State" are
available.

The exclusionary rule therefore. should not be extended

to cover these cases.
Even if suppression might be required in some cases, the
State would argue that a defendant must make "a substantial
showing of misstatement" before a hearing into the veracity of

affidavits supporting a warrant must be held.

The State contends

that petitioner's offer of proof did not amount to such a showing.
The State's only other sensible argument is that suppression
should not be required where the misstatement is not "material"
in the sense that probable cause would be lacking without it.
And, it ar&ues, in this case probable cause was present even
disregarding the challenged portions of the affidavit.
C. United States as Amicus.

The SG makes a persuasive (to

me) argument that the Fourth Amendment demands some protection
against police falsification of affidavits in support of search
warrants.

I will not rehearse this argument at length here.

The

SG's argument would result in the law being structured as follows:
1. When police intentionally have falsified
~

,

~ffi4Q.Vlt. ,

"the exclusionary rule should be applied whenever the falsified

~~~~nformation
~

Q\\

is likely to have influenced the magistrate's decision

to issue the warrant, whether or not it was essential to the
establishment of probable cause."

Brief for U.S. 9; see id., at 26.

2. When police make misstatements in all innocence,
suppression- is not

re g ui ~ed

even if the misstatements are material.

-Id., at3. 9,"[A]n27. unintentional material misrepresentation

[should]

void[ ] the warrant if made recklessly, but not if m~ merely
negligently." Id., at 28o

By "material misrepresentation," the

SG apparently means that it "was essential to the establishment of
probable cause."
4. Before a defendant is entitled to a hearing on the veracity

l
f

of affidavits supporting a warrant, he must (a) indicate with
specificity the portions of the affidavit alleged to be false;
(b) characterize the government's responsibility for the falsity
as either intentional or reckless; and (c) substantiate his
assertions with affidavits or other sworn stat·e ments from his
intended witnesses.

"In cases where satisfaction of the affidavit

requirement would be impractical

(~,

where the defendant intends

to call a hostile witness, such as a police officer), the defendant
should inform the court of these difficulties and should submit an
affidavit setting forth the testimony that he expects to present
at an evidentiary hearing to establish the falsity of the
representations made to procure the search warrant." Id., at 32.- 33.
1

Under the SG's proposed rules, he would remand the case for

I

further consideration.

Although he agrees with the State that

the alleged misrepresentations may not have been "material" in
the sense that they were "essential to the establishment of

probable cause," under the SG's rules suppression nonetheless would

-

be required if the misrepresentations were made intentionahly.
Petitioner's oral offer of proof can fairly be read as alleging
that the misstatements were made intentionally.

Although petitioner

did not support his allegation with affidavits, the SG apparently
the way open for him to do so on remand.
Amicus.

~~~~----~----

The ACLU urges the Court to limit

to the case of intentional misrepresentations
to probable cause.

This, it urges, is such a

If the Court should go beyond this limited case, however,

the ACLU would support suppressing warrants based on affidavits
containing

neglige~ ,

as well as intentional and reckless,

misstatements of fact.
IV. DISCUSSION.
I find the SG's position attractive in the main.

I agree

withi him that there are some cases - most notably, those
involving intentional misstatements of fact - where defendants
should be able to go behind the face of a a warrant.

My only

problem with his proposed solution is that it is a little
elaborate.

/'1\

One way to simplify the SG's construction would be

to ~

~hat intentional or reckless mistatements will void a warrant,
supported
but only if the ~ant would not be

'-

~

the misstatement •

l

b~ probable cause without

's"'

ai~atements would not void

Negligent

a warrant in any circumstanceso

The problem with this formulation

would be that it would not penalize intentional misstatements
~

where the warrant would be supported without them, whereas

the SG's formulation wouldo

It is a judgment call as to whether

the increased complexity of the SG's formulation is justified
by its increased deterrence of intentional misstatements.

My

own preference would be to adopt the SG's formulation because
of its

*

increas~d _de te ~ ence,
--~

If the simplfied

-

but reasonable people could differ.

9~!

1~~~1 •

~·1&11f

version were adopted, it would have to ~~

be decided whether the allegedly false statements in the affidavits
here were "material" in the sense that the warrant would be
supported by probable

cause without them.

My own feeling is that

they were not "material" in this sense.

But since no lower

court has passed on this issue, this Court might just announce
the rule and remand for

determination of the materiality issue.

Under the SGvs formulation, where materiality does not matter
if the misstatements were intentional, a remand certainly would
be required.
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CHAMBERS OF"

June 7, 1978

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 77-5176

~

Franks v. Delaware

Dear Han:y;

Please join ne.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Blackrmm

cc;

The Conference

~u:prtntt

<!Jourl of tJrt ~b ~brlts

2lfz;ur!p:ngton. ~. <!J.

ZOe?~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w...

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

June 7, 1978

RE: No. 77-5176 Franks v. Delaware
Dear Harry:
I agree.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

~u:punu

<!fonri of tqt ~nitt~ j;tatts

'Jlltllfrittgbm. ~.

<!f.

-

2llc?,.~

CHAMBERS OF"

June 7, 1978

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Re:

No. 77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware

I propose a few changes on pages 2, 21 and 32 of the
typed draft circulated this morning. New pages are enclosed
and should replace the earlier ones.

I
(

,I

No. 77-5176

- 2 -

may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police

to procure a search warrant.

We reverse, and we hold that, where

the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,

the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the de-

fendant' s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation

of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a

preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material

set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to

establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the

fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause

was lacking on the face of the affidavit.

No. 77-5176
- 21 -

In saying this, however, one must give cognizance to com-

peting values that lead us to impose limitations.

They perhaps can

best be addressed by noting the arguments of respondent and others

against allowing veracity challenges.

The arguments are several:

First, respondent argues that the exclusionary rule, created

in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), is not a personal con-

stitutional right, but only a judicially-created remedy extended where

its benefit as a deterrent promises to outweigh the societal cost of its

use; that the Court has declined to apply the exclusionary rule when

illegally seized evidence is used to impeach the credibility of a de-

fendant 1 s testimony, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), is

used in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

338 (1914), or is used in a civil trial, United States v. Janis, 4.28 U.S.

433 (1976); and that the Court similarly has restricted application

I

I

r

I

/

No. 77-5176
- 32 -

of Members of this Court as to the wisdom of extending the exclu-

sionary rule to collateral areas, such as civil or grand jury pro-

ceedings, the Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more

efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress

evidence from the State's case where a Fourth Amendment violation

has been substantial and deliberate.

See Brewer v. Williams, 430

U.S. 387, 422 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 538 (1976) (dissenting opinion).

We see no principled basis for

distinguishing between the question of the sufficiency of an affidavit,

which also is subject to a post-search reexamination, and the ques-

tion of its good faith.
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinio

Court.

This case presents an important and longstanding

Fourth Amendment law.

Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding

ever have the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendm.ents,

subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge

the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting

the warrant?

In the present case the Supreme Court of Delaware held, as

a matter of first impression for it, that a defendant under no circumstanc e

f

f
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may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police

to procure a search warrant.

We reverse, and .we hold that, where

the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,

the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the de-

fendant' s request.

In the event that at that hearing the allegation

lor reckless disregar~
of perjury)is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the

evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side,

the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable

cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search

excluded from the prosecution's case-in-chief.

•'·
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I

The controversy over the veracity of the search warrant

affidavit in this case arose in connection with petitioner Jerome

Franks' state conviction for rape, kidnaping, and burglary.

On

Friday. March 5, 1976, Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police in Dover,

Delaware, that she had been confronted in her home earlier that

morning by a man with a knife, and that he had sexually assaulted

her.

She described her assailant's age, race, height, build, and

facial hair, and gave a detailed

description of his clothing as con-

sisting of a white thermal undershirt, black pants with a silver or

gold buckle, a brown leather three-quarter length coat, and a dark

knit cap that he wore pulled down around his eyes.

That same day, petitioner Franks coincidentally was taken

into custody for an assault involving a 15-year-old girl, Brenda

No. 77-!
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Bradley, six days earlier.

After his formal arrest, and while awaiting

a bail hearing in Family Court, petitioner
allegedly
stated to Robert
.
-

McClements, the youth officer accompanying him, that he was sur-

prised the bail hearing was "about Brenda Bradley.

thought you said Bailey.

I know her.

I

I don't know her." Trial Tr. 175, 186.

At

the time of this statement, the police allegedly had not yet recited to

petitioner his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

On the following Monday, March 8, officer McClements

happened to mention the courthouse incident to a detective, Ronald R.

Brooks, who was working on the Bailey case.

191.

Trial Tr. 186, 190-

On March 9, detective Brooks and detective Larry D. Gray

submitted a sworn affidavit to a justice of the peace in Dover, in

!:_/
support of a warrant to search petitioner's apartment.

In para-

graph 8 of the affidavit's "probable cause page" mention was made

No. 77

176

- 5 -

of petitioner 1 s statement to McClements.

In paragraph 10, it was

noted that the description of the assailant given to the police by Mrs.

Bailey included the above-mentioned clothing.

Finally, the affidavit

also described the attempt made by police to confirm that petitioner•s

typical outfit matched that of the assailant.

Paragraph 15 recited:

••on Tuesday, 3/9/76, your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams

and Mr. Wesley Lucas of the Delaware Youth Center where Jerome

Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both

these people.

11

Paragraphs 16 and 17 respectively stated:

11

Mr. James

Williams revealed to your affiant that the normal dress of Jerome

Franks does consist of a white knit thermal undershirt and a brown

leather jacket,

11

and

11

Mr. Wesley Lucas revealed to your affiant

that in addition to the thermal undershirt and jacket, ' Jerome Franks

often wears a dark green knit hat.

11

No. 77-51

- 6The warrant was issued on the basis of this affidavit.

App. 9.

Pursuant to the warrant, police searched petitioner• s apartment and found

a white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark pants, and a leather jacket,

and, on petitioner•s kitchen table, a single-blade knife.

All these

ultimately were introduced in evidence at trial.

Prior to the trial, however, petitioner•s counsel filed a

written motion to suppress the clothing and the knife found in the search;

this motion alleged that the warrant on its face did not show probable

cause and that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

~·,

at 11-12.

At the hearing on the motion .to

suppress, defense counsel orally amended the challenge to include an attack

on the veracity of the warrant affidavit; he also specifically requested

the right to call as witnesses detective Brooks, Wesley Lucas of the

No. 77-.
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Youth Center, and James Morrison, formerly of the Youth Center.

Id., at 14-17.

Counsel asserted that -Lucas and Morrison would testify

that neither had been personally interviewed by the warrant affiants,

and that, although they might have talked to another police officer,

any information given by them to that officer was "somewhat different"

from what was recited in the affidavit.

Id., at 16.

Defense counsel

charged that the misstatements were included in the affidavit not

inadvertently, but in "bad faith." Id., at 25.

Counsel also sought

permission to call officer McClements and petitioner as witnesses,

to seek to establish that petitioner 1 s courthouse statement to police

had been obtained in violation of petitioner 1 s Miranda rights, and

that the search warrant was thereby tainted as the fruit of an illegally

obtained confession.

Id. , at 17, 27.

No. 77- .
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- 8 In rebuttal, the State's attorney argued in detail, App. 15-

24, (a) that Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, ._ § § 2306 a:nd 2307 (1974), con-

templated that any challenge to a search warrant was to be limited

to questions of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit; (b) that,

purportedly, a majority of the States whose practice was not dictated

'}_/
by statute observed such a rule;

and (c) that federal cases on the

issue were to be distinguished because of Fed. Rule Grim. Proc.

4/
4l(e).

He also noted that

this Court had reserved the general issue of subfacial challenge to

veracity in United States v. Rugendorf, 376 U.S. 528, 531-532 (1964), when

it disposed of that case on the ground that, even if a veracity challenge

were permitted, the alleged factual inaccuracies in that case's affidavit

"were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause,

No.
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- 9and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not

go to the integrity of the affidavit.

petitioner's

11

11

Id., at 532.

The State objected to

going behind [the warrant affidavit] in any way,

argued that the court must decide petitioner's motion

corners 11 of the affidavit.

11

11

and

on the four

App. 21.

The trial court sustained the State's objection to petitioner• s

proposed evidence.

Id., at 25, 27.

The motion to suppress was denied,

and the clothing and knife were admitted as evidence at the ensuing trial.

Trial Tr. 192-196.

Petitioner was convicted.

In a written Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal and/or New Trial, Record Document No. 23,

petitioner repeated his objection to the admission of the evidence,

stating that he

11

should have been allowed to impeach the Affidavit used

in the Search Warrant to show purposeful misrepresentation of informa-

tion contained therein.

11

Id., at 2.

The motion was denied, and

petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years

each and an additional consecutive life sentence.

No. 77-5
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed.

A. 2d 578 (1977).

373

It agreed with what it deemed to be the ••majority

rule 11 that no attack upon the veracity of a warrant affidavit could be

made:

11

We agree with the majority rule for two reasons.

First, it is the function of the is suing magistrate to
determine the reliability of information and credibility
of affiants in deciding whether the requirement of
probable cause has been met.

There has been no need

demonstrated for interfering with this function.

Second,

neither the probable cause nor suppression hearings
are adjudications of guilt or innocence; the matters
asserted by defendant are more properly considered
in a trial on the merits.

II

Id., at

sao.

Because of this resolution, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that

there was no need to consider petitioner's

11

other contentions,

relating to the evidence that would have been introduced for impeach-

ment purposes.

11

Ibid.
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Franks' petition for certiorari presented only the issue

whether the trial court had erred in refusing to consider his alle-

gation of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit.

EJ

Because

of the importance of the question, and because of the conflict among

both state and federal courts, we granted certiorari.

( 1977).

434 U.S.

No. 77-5
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It may be well first to note how we are. compelled to reach

the Fourth Amendment is sue proffered in this case.

In particular,

the State 1 s proposals of an independent and adequate state ground

and of harmless error do not dispose of the controversy.

Respondent argues that petitioner's trial counsel, who is

not the attorney representing him in this Court, failed to include the

challenge to the veracity of the warrant affidavit in the written motion

to suppress filed before trial, contrary to the requirement of Del.

Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 4l(e) (1974) that a motion to suppress

"shall state the grounds upon which it is made.

11

The Supreme Court

of Delaware, however, disposed of petitioner's Fourth Amend-

ment claim on the merits.

A ruling on the merits of a federal question

by the highest state court leaves the federal question open to review

No.

77- ~

6

- 13 -

in this Court.

Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U.S. 123,

134 (1914); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 436-437 (1959);

Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-242 (1969).

Respondent next suggests that any error here was hartnless.

Assuming arguendo, respondent says, that petitioner's Fourth Amend-

ment claim was valid, and that the warrant should have been tested

for veracity and the evidence excluded, it is still clear beyond a reason-

able doubt that the evidence complained of did not contribute to peti-

tioner's conviction.

(1970).

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53

This contention falls of its own weight.

trial was that of consent.

The sole is sue at

Petitioner admitted, App. 37, that he had

engaged in sexual relations with Mrs. Bailey on the day in question.

She testified, Trial Tr. 50-51, 69-70, that she had not consented

to this, and that petitioner, - - - - - - - - - --

--3>
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upon first encountering her in the house, had threatened her with a

knife to force her to submit.

Petitioner claimed that she had given

full consent and that no knife had been present.

Id., at 254, 271.

To corroborate its contention that consent was lacking, the State

introduced in evidence a stainless steel wooden-handled kitchen

knife found by the detectives on the kitchen table in petitioner's

apartment four days after the alleged rape.

Id., at 195-196; Magis-

Record Document No. 22.
trate' s Return on the Search Warrant March 9, 1976, Defense counsel

objected to its admission, arguing that Mrs. Bailey had not given any

detailed description of the knife alleged to be involved in the incident

and had claimed to have seen the knife only in "pitch blackness."

at 195.

~·,

The State obtained its admission, however, as a knife that

matched the description contained in the search warrant, and Mrs.

Bailey testified that the knife allegedly used was, like the knife in

No. 77-5 !
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evidence. single -edged and not a pocket knife, and that the knife in

evidence was the same length and thickness as the knife used in the

crime.

Id., at 69, 114-115.

The State carefully elicited from

detective Brooks the fact that this was the only knife found in peti-

tioner's apartment.

Id., at 196.

Although respondent argues that

the knife was presented to the jury as

11

merely exemplary of the

generic class of weapon testimonially described by the victim,

11

Brief for Respondent 15-16, the State at trial clearly meant to suggest

that this was the knife that had been used against Mrs. Bailey.

Had

the warrant been quashed, and the knife excluded from the trial as

evidence. we cannot say with any assurance that the jury would have

reached the same decision on the issue of consent, particularly since

there was other countervailing evidence on that issue.

No. 77-5
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- 16 We should note, in addition, why this case cannot be treated

as was the situation in Rugendorf v. United States, supra.

There

the Court held that no Fourth Amendment question was presented

when the claimed misstatements in the search warrant affidavit

"were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause,

and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go

to the integrity of the affidavit." 376 U.S., at 532 (emphasis added).

Rugendorf emphasized that the "erroneous statements • . . were not

those of the affiant" and thus "fail[ ed] to show that the affiant was in

bad faith or that he made any misrepresentations to the Commissioner

~I
in securing the warrant.

11

Id., at 533.

Here, whatever the judgment

may be as to the relevancy of the alleged misstatements, the integrity

of the affidavit was directly placed in issue by petitioner in his alle-

gation that the affiants did not, as claimed, speak directly to Lucas
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and Morrison.

Whether such conversations took place is surely a

matter "within the personal knowledge of the affiant[ s]." We also

might note that although respondent's brief puts forth that the alleged

misrepresentations in the affidavit were of little importance in estab-

lishing probable cause, Brief for Respondent 16, respondent at oral

argument appeared to disclaim any reliance on Rugendorf.

Oral Arg. 30.

,.

'"

Tr. of
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III

Whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the

derivative exclusionary rule made applicable to the States under

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), ever mandate that a defendant

be permitted to attack the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the

warrant has been issued and executed, is a question that encounters confli c

ing values. The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course,

is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions,

police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate

before embarking upon a search.

In deciding today that, in certain ·

circumstances, a challenge to a warrant's veracity must be permitted;

we derive our ground from language of the Warrant Clause itself,

which surely takes the affiant• s good faith as its premise:

"[ N] o

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

No. 77-~
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affirmation . . .

"

Judge Frankel, in United States v. Halsey, 257

F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (SDNY 1966), aff1 d, Docket No. 31369 (CA 2
II.

1967) (unreported), put the matter simply:

[W]hen the Fourth Amend-

ment demands a factual showing su:£ficient to comprise 1probable

cause,

1

the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing"

(emphasis in original).

This does not mean "truthful" in the sense

that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct,

for probable cause may be

found~d

upon hearsay and upon information

received from informants, as well as upon information within the

affiant 1 s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily.

But surely it is to be "truthful" in the sense that the information put

forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.

It is established law, see Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41,

47 (1933); Gicordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-486 (1958);
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Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-115 (1964), that a warrant

affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the

existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an

independent evaluation of the matter.

If an informant's tip is the source

of information, the affidavit must recite "some of the underlying cir-

cumstances from which the informant concluded" that relevant evidence

might be discovered, and "some of the underlying circumstances from

which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not

be disclosed, was 1 credible' or his information 1 reliable.

114.

1

"

Id., at

Because it is the magistrate who must determine independently

whether there is probable cause, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.

10, 13-14 (1948); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-271 (1960),

it would be an unthinkable imposition upon his authority if a warrant
or recklessly
affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately false statement,
were to stand beyond impeachment.
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In saying this, however, one must give cognizance to com-

peting values that lead us to impose limitations.

They perhaps can

best be addressed by noting the arguments of respondent and others

against allowing veracity challenges.

The arguments are several;

First, respondent notes that the exclusionary rule, created

in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), is not a personal con-

stitutional right, but only a judicially-created remedy extended where

its benefit as a deterrent promises to outweigh the societal cost of

its use.

The Court, accordingly, has declined to apply the exclusionary

rule when illegally seized evidence is used to impeach the credibility

of a defendant's testimony, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62

(1954), is used in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra,

414 U.S. 338 (1974), or is used in a civil trial, United States v. Janis,

428 U.S. 433 (1976).

The Court similarly has restricted application
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of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in federal habeas

corpus review of a state conviction . . See Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465 ( 1976 ).

Respondent argues that applying the exclusionary

or reckless
rule to another situation -- the deterrence of deliberate untruthfulness

in a warrant affidavit -- is not justified for many of the same reasons

that led to the above restrictions; interfering with a criminal con-

viction in order to deter official misconduct is a burden too great to

impose on society.

Second, respondent argues that a citizen's privacy interests

are adequately protected by a requirement that applicants for a

warrant submit a sworn affidavit and by the magistrate's independent

determination of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit.

Apply-

ing the exclusionary rule to attacks upon veracity would weed out a

minimal number of perjurious government statements, says respondent,

No. 77-51 .

- 23 -

but would overlap unnecessarily with existing penalties against perjury,

including criminal prosecutions, departmental d·i scipline for mis-

conduct., contempt of court, and civil actions.

Third, it is argued that the magistrate already is equipped to

conduct a fairly vigorous inquiry into the accuracy of the factual

affidavit supporting a warrant application.

He may question the affiant,

or st1nunon other persons to give testimony at the warrant proceeding.

The incremental gain from a post-search adversary proceeding, it is

said, would not be great.

Fourth, it is argued that it would unwisely diminish the

solemnity and moment of the magistrate 1 s proceeding to make his

inquiry into probable cause reviewable in regard to veracity.

The

less final., and less deference paid to, the magistrate 1 s determination

of veracity, the less initiative will he use in that task.

Denigration
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of the magistrate 1 s function would be imprudent insofar as his scrutiny

is the last bulwark preventing any particular in.vasion of privacy

before it happens.

Fifth, it is argued that permitting a post-search evidentiary

hearing on issues of veracity would confuse the pressing issue of

guilt or innocence with the collateral question as to whether there

had been official misconduct in the drafting of the affidavit.

The

weight of criminal dockets, and the need to prevent diversion of

attention from the main is sue of guilt or innocence, militate against

such an added burden on the trial courts.

And if such hearings were

conducted routinely, it is said, they would be ·misused by defendants

as a convenient source of discovery.

Defendants might even use the

hearings in an attempt to force revelation of the identity of informants.
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Sixth and finally, it is argued that a post- search veracity

challenge is inappropriate because the accuracy of ·an affidavit in

large part is beyond the control of the affiant.

An affidavit may

properly be based on hearsay, on fleeting observations, and on tips

received from unnamed informants whose identity often will be properly

protected from revelation under McCray v. illinois, 386 U.S. 300

( 1967).

None of these considerations is trivial.

Indeed, because of

them, the rule announced today has a limited scope, both in regard

to when exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a

hearing on allegations of misstatements must be accorded.

But

neither do the considerations cited by respondent and others have

a fully controlling weight; we conclude that they are insufficient to

justify an absolute ban on post-search impeachment of veracity.

On this side of the balance, also, there are pressing considerations:
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First, a flat ban on impeachment of veracity could denude
'

the probable cause requirement of all-real meaning.

The require-

ment that a warrant not issue "but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation, " would be reduced to a nullity if a police

officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demon-

strate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was

able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.

It is this

specter of intentional falsification that, we think, has evoked such

widespread opposition to the flat nonimpeachment rule from the

7/
commentators,

from the American Law Institute in its Model Code

of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § SS 290. 3 (1 ), from the federal

Courts of Appeals, and from some state courts.

On occasion, of

course, an instance of deliberate falsity will be exposed and confirmed

without a

see United States ex rel. Petillo v.
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New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152, 1171-1172 (N.J. 197 5 ), vacated

and remanded by order sub

~

Albanese v. Yeager, 541 F. 2d

275 (CA3 1976), or at a hearing on the sufficiency of the affidavit,

cf. United States v. Upshaw, 448 F. 2d 1218, 1221-1222 (CAS 1971),

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 ( 1972 ).

A flat nonimpeachment rule

would bar reexamination of the warrant even in these cases.

Second, the hearing before the magistrate not always will
lawless or reckless
suffice to discourage misconduct. The pre-search proceeding is

necessarily~

parte, since the subject of the search cannot be tipped

off to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove evidence.

The usual reliance of our legal system on adversary proceedings itself

should be an indication that

vigorous.

an~

parte inquiry is likely to be less

The magistrate has no acquaintance with the information

that may contradict the good faith and reasonable basis of the affiant's

allegations.

The pre- search proceeding will frequently be marked
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by haste, because of the understandable desire to act before the

evidence disappears; this urgency will not always permit the magistrate

to make an extended independent examination of the affiant or other

witnesses.

Third, the alternative sanctions of a perjury prosecution,

administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit are not likely to

fill the gap.

Mapp v. Ohio, supra, implicitly rejected the adequacy

of these alternatives.

Mr. Justice Douglas noted this in his con-

currence in Mapp, 367 U.S., at 670, where he quoted from Wolf v.

Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949 ):

11

'Self- scrutiny is a lofty ideal,

but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney

to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of

the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or

his associates have ordered.

1 11
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Fourth, allowing an evidentiary hearing, after a suitable

preliminary proffer of material falsity, would not diminish the

importance and solemnity of the warrant-issuing process.

~parte

It is the

nature of the initial hearing, rather than the magistrate's

capacity, that is the reason for the review.

A magistrate's deter-

mination is presently subject to review before trial as to sufficiency

without any undue interference with the dignity of the magistrate's

function.

Our reluctance today to extend the rule of exclusion beyond

instances of deliberate misstatements, and those of reckless disregard,

leaves a broad field where the magistrate is the sole protection of a

citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, namely, in instances where police

have been merely negligent in checking or recording the facts relevant

to a probable cause determination.
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Fifth, the claim that a post- search hearing will confuse the

issue of the defendant's guilt with the issue of the State's possible

misbehavior is footless.

of the jury.

The hearing will not be in the presence

An issue extraneous to guilt already is examined in

any probable cause determination or review of probable cause.

Nor,

if a sensible threshold showing is required and sensible substantive

requirements for suppression are maintained, need there be any

new large-scale commitment of judicial resources; many claims

will wash out at an early stage, and the more substantial ones in any

event would require judicial resources for vindication if the suggested

alternative sanctions were truly to be effective.

The requirement of

a substantial preliminary showing should suffice to prevent the misuse

of a veracity hearing for purposes of discovery or obstruction.

And

because we are faced today with only the question of the integrity of
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the affiant's representations as to his own activities, we need not de-

cide, and we in no way predetermine, the difficult question whether

a reviewing court must ever require the revelation of the identity

of an informant once a substantial preliminary showing of falsity

has been made.

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the

Court's earlier disquisition in this area, concluded only that the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require

the State to expose an informant's identity routinely, upon a

defendant's mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the

probable cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable

and his information credible.

Sixth and finally, as to the argument that the exclusionary

rule should not be extended to a "new" area, we cannot regard any

such extension

Despite the deep skepticism
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of Members of this Court as to the wisdom of extending the exclu-

sionary rule to collateral areas, such as · civil or g·rand jury pro-

ceedings, the Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more

efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress

evidence from the State•s criminal case-in-chief where a Fourth

Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate.

See Brewer

v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (~issenting opinion).

We see no

principled basis for distinguishing between the question of the

sufficiency of an affidavit, which also is subject to a post-search

reexamination, and the question of its good faith.
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IV
In sum, and to repeat with some embellishment what we

stated at the beginning of this opinion: There is, of course, a pre-

sumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search

warrant.

To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack

must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than

a mere desire to cross-examine.

There must be allegations of

deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those

allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.

They should

point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is

claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement

of supporting reasons.

Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable

statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satis-

factorily explained.

Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake
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The falsity or reckless disregard whose impeach-

ment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any non-

governmental informant.

Finally, if these requirements are met,

and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or

reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content

in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no

§_I
hearing is required.

On the other hand, if the remaining content

is insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth Amend-

ment, to his hearing.

Whether he will prevail at that hearing is, of

course, another is sue.

Because of Delaware's absolute rule, its courts did not have

occasion to consider the proffer put forward by petitioner Franks.

Since the framing of suitable rules to govern proffers is a matter

'

.

.
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proffer.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware is reversed,

and the case is

r~manded

for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

'j:,

June 8,

Franks

Dear Harry:
Please join me.

lfp/ss
cc:

....

j''

The Conference

.

'·"''

June 8, 1978

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim Alt

Re: Justice Blackmun's opLnLon for the Court in No. 77-5176,
Franks v. Delaware.
This opinion, although rather lengthy, comes out precisely
where I would.

It holds that where a defendant shows that an

affiant knowingly or recklessly

m~

false statements in an

affidavit supporting a search warrant, and where the warrant will

-----------------------

not support probable cause without the

state~ents,

the defendant

is entitled to suppression of evidence seized pursuant to the

- --- ------

warrant.

The opinion also requires the defendant to make a

substantial showing before he is entitled to a hearing on the
~

veracity of statements in the affidavit:
"To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack
must be more than conclusory and must be supported by
more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be
accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out
specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is
claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a
statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or
otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be
furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained."

-

------------------------------

2.

form · the · .basis for suppression o (You: wrote, "I'm not at rest as to
effect of 'reckless' action by police.

Difference between

negligence and reckless conduct often is difficult to determi.ne.")
My own view is that trial judges are able to tell the difference
between the two, and that in doubtful cases they are likely to
give the

benefit of doubt to the police.

I also think that

police should not be able to insulate their conduct by deliberately
ignoring whether their statements are true
my conception of "reckless" conduct.

or false, which is

There is a parallel to be

drawn here to the constitutional test for libel of public figures;
i.e.,

wilful falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.

I would be inclined to go along with Justice Blackmun's

Thus,

standard.

The only question I have about the opinion is whether it would
be kinder

1 involved.

not to mention the names of the two rape victims
You took pains not to do so in Neil v. Biggers, 409

U.S. 188 (1972), and we consciously have followed this policy
this Term in Moore v. Illinois, No. 76-5344, and Browder v.
Director, Dept. of Corrections, No. 76-5325.

Given Justice

Blackmun's acute sensitivity to the feelings and dignity of rape
victims, see his concurrence in Moore v. Illinois, I would think
he would be eager to avoid embarrassment of this kind.

Although

the similarity between the names of the two victims played an
apparent part in the chain of events leading to petr's arrest,
~ A see Opinion at 3-4, I would think the Justice could re-write this

i lpart if he truly were concerned about the victims' feelings.
JA

-

..in:prtntt OJourl cf tlrt ~h .ihtf.tg
~ag!p:ttgLm, ~.

<!f.

2!lP:J!.~

CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE POTTER ST E WART

June 8, 1978

Re: No. 77-5176, Franks v. Delaware
Dear Harry,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

() ~)'

\7

Mr. Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

~npr.tmt <IJ:ourlltf f4.t ~ttb ~htf:tg
'~lhu~fringhm. ~.

OJ:.

2ll~$

CHAMBERS OF"

/

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 8, 1978

Re:

77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference

~ttpr.tttU

Qf01trl qf tlft ~tb ~taf.tg

jiru;Ipngfut4gl. <If. 211~~;1
C HAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 9, 1978

Re:

No. 77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware

Dear Harry:
As I told you on the telephone yesterday, the Chief
has asked me to try a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

~nr--

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

•

;§u:prtntt <qmtrt of tlrt 'Jttittb- i'ta!ttt
~a:ttfringhm. ~.

<q.

CHAMBERS OF

June 12, 1978

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

2ll.?J.l.~

77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware

Dear Harry,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

-

.$)u.prtntt <!Jettrllli tqt ~ttb ~f:attg
~all !p:ng:to-n. ~. <!}. 20c?.1! ~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 19, 1978

Re:

77-5176 - Franks v. · Delaware

Dear Bill:
I join your dissent.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

/
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